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The notion of "local control" has an enduring resonance in American education,
yet the law gives state officials the upper hand
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n a December 2003 decision, a Colorado trial court judge
invalidated the state's new school voucher program. The decision was unusual in that the court relied not on traditional separation-of-church-and-state concerns, but instead on a provision
of the Colorado state constitution that vests control over public
education in local school boards. The court held that by failing to
give local school boards any"input whatsoever into the instruction
to be offered by the private schools" that accepted voucher students,
the state had violated the constitutional provision that grants
local boards "control of instruction in the public schools of their
respective districts."
The ruling in Colorado Congress of Parents v. Owens, which has
already been appealed, illustrates the longstanding tension in
American education law between two competing models of the
relationship between states and local school boards. The dominant approach has treated school boards as legally subordinate to
their states, recognizing that most state constitutions explicitly
assign responsibility for and authority over public education to the
state government. While the states' nearly unlimited authority
has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts, there has been intermittent legal recognition of the de facto autonomy enjoyed by
local school boards in the day-to-day operation and management
of their schools. Moreover, as the Colorado decision indicates,
courts have occasionally recognized-and even celebratedthe powerful tradition of local control in American education.
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However, the Colorado case is the rare example of
local control's successfully trumping state action. Over
all, the tradition of local control has not constrained the
states' role in education. On the contrary, local-control
arguments h ave been most successful in court when
the states themselves h ave wielded them as a means of
resisting new obligations, such as equalizing spending
between wealthy and poor districts. In other words, local
control is primarily a matter of stare policy rather than
a constraint imposed by federal or state constitutional
law on rhe states' role in education. States assert the prin
ciple of local control when it is convenient for them to
do so, without yielding much authority to local school
boards.

"Arms of the State"
The roughly 1 5,000 local school districts in rhe United
States account for more than one-sixth of all American
local governments. Of these districts, more than 90 per
cent are legally and politically independent of their sur
rounding counties or municipalities; the vast major ity are
governed by elected boards.
( H owever, a number o f states
have recently authorized the may
ors of big cities, such as Cleve
land and Detroit, to appoint some
or all of the members of their
school boards, while New York
gave the mayor of New York City
the power to appoint a commis
sioner of education to run the
city's schools . ) In some states,
local school boards also enjoy fis
cal independence, including the
powe r to l evy taxes. In most
scares, however, school boards are
fiscally dependent on other local
governments.
The legal status of school
boards flows from two key fac
tors. Fi rst, sch ool districts are
local go vernments and thus, like
all other local governments, are
subordinate co their states. Second, unlike counties and municipalities, school districts
have a single function- the provision of public educa
tion-that is considered a state responsibility. Virtually
every state constitution requires the state legislature to
p rovide for a system of free public education. The exis
tence of such a mandate is an unusual departure in

American constitutionalism- which has traditionally
been focused on limiting government power, not creat
i ng obligations to provide a public service-and is a
tribute to the central role of public education in Amer
ican culture. Thus, as units specializing in public edu
cation, school districts are often seen as agencies of the
state-sometimes, rhetorically, "arms of the state" - for
the implementation of the state's education mandate.
The state interest in education affects the powers of
local school boards significantly. First, there is far greater
state oversight of school boards than of other local gov
ernments. State boards of education and state education
agencies pro mulgate extensive regulations gove rning
school board behavior and school district operations.
There is no comparable state administrative officer or
body-other than the legislature itself-with similar
powers over counties, cities, or other localities . State
legislatures also heavily regulate the school system,
through laws dealing with school district organization,
elections, and governance; education programs, instruc
tional materials, and proficiency testi ng; attendance
rules; the length of the school day
and school year; teacher creden
tialing, tenure, and pensions; the
construction and maintenance of
school buildings; school district
finances and budgets; school
safety; parents' and students' rights
and responsibilities; and virtually
every other aspect of school oper
ations and policy. By my count,
14 volumes of the C aliforni a leg
islative code concern education.
Finally, the strong state :inter
est in education means that local
school boards tend to have rela
tively limited powers to initiate
policies on their own. One recent
study in Kansas found that school
districts h ad to ob tain express
statutory authority to hire lobby
ists; operate alternative schools;
share guidance programs; e nter
into interdistrict agreements to
share personnel or computer systems; pay dues to the Kansas
Association of School Boards; educate military depen
dents; or obtain boiler, fire, auto, health, or student
insurance. To be sure, other studies have found that
courts have construed the implied powers of school dis
tricts broadly, particularly in recent years, perm itting
greater "freedom and experimentation" than the formal

States assert the
principle of local
control when it is
convenient for
them to do so,
without yielding
much authority
to local school
boards.
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limitations of school board powers would suggest, including the
ability to add to the state-prescribed curriculum and to supplement state-mandated materials. Yet while school boards'
capacity to innovate may be
greater in practice than ic is in
theory, they enjoy less autonomy
than other local governments.

Hostile Takeovers

The rise of
charter schools
reflects the
subordinate
position of local
school districts
vis-a-vis state
governments.

One of the clearest illustrations
of states' power relative to school
districts is the freedom they enjoy
to restructure or displace locally
elected school boards. For
instance, the judiciary treated New
York Stace's 1961 reorganization of
the New York City Board of Education as akin to an internal restructuring of a branch of
state government rather than an infringement on local
autonomy. The legislature, at the request of the city's
mayor, eliminated the board of education and authorized
the mayor to appoint a new board from a list of nominees
prepared by the legislature. When the ousted board members filed suit, claiming that the state's action violated the
principle of home rule, the New York Court of Appealsthe state's highest court-sided with the state. The court
argued that board of education members were "officers of
an independent corporation separate and distinct from
t he city, created by the State for the purpose of carrying
out a purely State function and are not city officers within
the compass of the constitution's home rule provision."
More recently, courts have upheld state laws ousting the
independently elected school boards in Cleveland, Detroit,
and Harrisburg, giving each city's mayor the power to
appoint all or most of the new board's members.
These high-profile restructurings were initiated by
local officials or resulted in the transfer of power to those
local officials. To chat extent, they may bolster local control even if t hey involve a loss of school board autonomy.
But state courts have been just as deferential to state laws
allowing the takeover of local districts by state appointees.
As of 2002, a total of 24 states had adopted laws authorizing a state education agency to displace a school board
and take over the operation of a school district in cases of
protracted problems with academic performance, fiscal
mismanagement, or corruption. In 15 states, state law
permits a state agency to take over an individual school.
The Education Commission of the States found that

-
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since the late 1980s there have
been nearly 50 school district
takeovers (some involving multiple state interventions in the same
dist rict) in 19 states. Courts have
found these measures co be well
within the state's prerogatives.

Diluted Local Authority

The rise of charter schools also
reflects the subordinate position of
local school districts and to some
extent further weakens their position. In most states the creation of
a charter school challenges a
school district's control over the
public schools within its borders.
Just 12 states vest the authority
to grant charter school applications solely in school districts. By
contrast, in 23 states, many institutions can approve charter schools, such as the state board of education, universities, a specially designated state board for charter schools,
or local school districts. In 26 states (including 10 of the
12 states above), the initial decision by a local school
board to deny a charter school application may be appealed
to the state board of education or another institution, thus
curbing school districts' control over the approval of charters even where school districts are given a role.
State courts have uniformly rejected challenges to
charter school-enabling legislation, relying on the plenary state power over public schools. In California an
appellate court found that charter schools easily fell
within the legislature's "sweeping and comprehensive
powers in relation to our public schools." The charter
schools were, like che school districts and county boards
of education challenging their charters, creatures of the
state"authorized to maintain" public schools. Similarly,
the Utah Supreme Court rejected the claim brought
by the state school boards association that the statute
authorizing the state board of education to approve
and supervise charter schools represented an unconstitutional expansion of the state board's authority into
the area of local schools.
Courts have also been reluctant to entertain suits by
school boards challenging decisions to grant particular
charter school applications. A Pennsylvania court held chat
a school district lacked standing to contest the grant of a
charter application, even though the school district had
alleged that che new school would draw students (and thus
state funds) away from the district.
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Great Power, Great Responsibility
Sometimes school boards can benefit from being subordinate to their states in the sense that states can be held
responsible for the fiscal health of school districts. For
instance, in the 1992 Butt v. State of California decision, the
California Supreme Court held that the state was constitutionally required to bail out a local school district that
decided to end the school year six weeks earlier than
planned because of acute financial difficulties.
The state had resisted the bailout, claiming the district
had received enough state support under California's
equalized school funding system. The state contended
that requiring additional state financial support would
enable a local district to" indulge in fiscal irresponsibility
without penalty." Moreover, the state argued that the
bailout would be inconsistent with the principle of local
control.
The California Supreme Court disagreed sharply. It
found that the state had long departed from local control
by taking an enormous role in school governance and
decisionmaking, including setting standards for and overseeing local school district budgets. Nor would a bailout make
fiscal mismanagement more likely
since th e state has authority to
"further tighten budgetary oversight, impose prudent, nondiscriminatory conditions on emergency State aid, and authorize
intervention by Scace education
officials to stabilize the management of local districts whose
imprudent policies have threatened their fiscal integrity." In any
event, the state's"ultimate responsibility for equal operation of the
common school system" meant
that the"State is obliged to intervene when a local district's fiscal
problems would otherwise deny
its students basic educational
equality."
The education clauses of state
constitutions have also provided
the legal foundation for the wave
of court-ordered school funding
equalization reforms over the past
three decades. State courts have repeatedly held states
responsible for ensuring that all students receive at lease
an adequate, though not necessarily equal, education. Such
decisions have forced many states co take a stronger role
in the funding and regulation of local schools. The legal the-

ory underlying school finance reform is predicated to a significant degree on the principle that Local school districts
are essentially agencies of the states, charged with providing
the education mandated by the state's constitution.

T he Value of "Local Control"
While demonstrating the states' Legal responsibility for
public education, the school finance cases also illustrate
the resonance of the local control principle. First, eight
state supreme courts have cited the value of local control
in upholding the states' reliance on local property taxes
to fund the schools, notwithstanding the resulting inequalities in spending among districts. Second, even in the many
cases where courts have sided with the plaintiffs and
demanded financing reforms, the courts have typically
ruled that individual local districts are free to raise and
spend above the level they deem "adequate." As the Arizona Supreme Court observed, in the course of striking
down che state's school financing system:

While demonstrating the states'
legal responsibility for public
education, the
school finance
movement also
illustrates the
resonance of
local control.
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Local control in these matters is
an important part of our culture.
Thus, school houses, school districts, and counties will not
always be che same because
some districts may either attach
greater importance co education
or have more wherewithal co
fund it. Nothing in our constitution prohibits this .... Indeed, if
citizens were not free co go
above and beyond the state
financed system to produce a
school system that meets their
needs, public education
statewide would suffer.

The principle of local control
has also played a pivotal role in
the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding school finance
reform. In che 1972 decision in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court
accepted co a considerable degree
the argument that the funding of
schools primarily through local property taxes resulted in
significant differences in school spending and quality from
district co district. Nevertheless, the Court upheld Texas's
school financing system because it grew out of and supported a system of local control.
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Local control is valuable, said the Court, because it facilitaces"che greatest participation by those most directly concerned" with school decisionmaking. It also, the Court
wrote, builds support for public schools, enables those
communities that wish "to devote more money to the
education" of their children co do so, and provides"opporcunity for exper imentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence:'The Court determined chat local-based financing was constitutionally justified, notwithstanding the resulting inequalities, because
the state could reasonably decide to promote local control
in public education. Indeed, the scace was not challenging
local control but instead relied on it to deflect a constitutional claim.
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The Supreme Court made an even more
powerful departure from che "school-discriccas-arm-of-the-stace" model in Milliken v. Bradley.
In chat case, che Court rejected a lower court's
order requiring interdistricc busing as a remedy for segregation in Detroit. The lower court
had fou nd that segregation in che Detroit
schools could not be remedied without including suburban school districts in the busing
program. In the lower court's view, Detroit
and the suburban districts were merely different components of a single Michigan school
system, so district boundaries could be ignored
in developing a remedy.
The Supreme Court rejected the distr ict
court's assertion chat the school district boundaries "are no more than arbitrary lines on a
map." Instead, che Court argued, "the notion
that school district lines may be casually
ignored or treated as a mere administrative
convenience is contrary to che history of public education in our country:'The Court found
that extending the busing remedy beyond the
Detroit system would undermine che autonomy of the suburban school dis trices.
The four dissentingjuscices pointed to the
considerable authority che state enjoyed over
school d iscriccs, including the "wide-ranging
powers co consolidate and merge school districts, even without the consent of the districts themselves or of the local citizenry."
Indeed, as the dissenters noted, between 1964
and 1972 Michigan had winnowed the number
of school districts statewide from 1,438 to
608. The prevailing view of the majority, however, was chat the state's formal authority to
consolidate school districts was irrelevant.
Unless che state itself ordered a consolidation,
the suburban school districts could rely on their independent existence to insulate themselves from Detroit's
problems. The federal courts had co respect the existing
school district boundary li nes, even if chat made impossible an effective remedy for segregation in che metropolitan area.

State Intervention, Local O pposition
Scace governments are typically successful in exercising
the authority their state constitutions give chem over public education. However, as the school finance cases demonstrate, states are perfectly willing to raise the principle of
local control when it suits their interests. In these cases, local
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control has been asserted by the state defensively co relieve
it from having co increase its school spending or take on
unsought oversight responsibilities. In short, che local control argument functioned as a shield to sustain state policy, not as a sword to alter policy in the direction of more
local control.
Only in a handful of cases have local school districts successfully used che idea oflocal control to resist state actions.
Not coincidentally, these cases arose in Colorado and
Wisconsin, two of the relative handful of states where the
state constitution directly grants power over local schools
co local school boards. The overwhelming majority of
state constitutions make no mention whatsoever of school
districts or local school boards.
For instance, in Board of Education No. 1 in the City and
County of Denver v. Booth, the Denver school board challenged Colorado's Charter Schools Act, which grants local
school boards the authority to approve or disapprove a
charter application. The board
asserted that the statute gives the
state board of education more
powers than the Colorado state
constitution permits and infringes
on the state constitution's provision that the local school board
"shall have control of instruction
in the public schools of their
respective districts:'
The Colorado charter statute
enables aspirants whose applications are denied by local school
boards co appeal to che state board
of education. The state board can
then force the district board co
reconsider. If che district board
again denies the application, the
charter applicant may again appeal
to the state board. If on the second
appeal the state board finds chat
granting the charter is in the public interest, ic may reverse and
remand to che district board"with instructions to approve
the charter applicant:'
In the 1999 Booth decision, the Colorado Supreme
Court rejected the Denver board's position, finding that the
constitution's grant of "general supervision" over public
education to the state board was broad enough to encompass the power co approve local charter schools. However,
the local board's authority could not be entirely displaced.
Rather, "as long as a school district exists, the local school
board has undeniable constitutional authority;' including
"substantial discretion regarding the character of instruc-

tion that students will receive at the district's expense."
The Colorado court struck a compromise that would
affirm the state board's authority as well as the local board's
interest"in controlling instruction."The state board could
order the local board to approve a charter application, but
it could not require the local board to actually open a
school or agree to all the terms of the charter applicant's proposal. Rather, the state board's order was treated merely as
a directive to the local board to negotiate with the applicant concerning the"issues necessary to permit the applicant to open a charter school;' including, in the Denver case,
questions of the site of the school and per-pupil funding.
In the recent Colorado Congress of Parents decision, a Colorado district court took the legal protection oflocal school
autonomy even further. The Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program, enacted in 2003, established a voucher
program for a limited number oflow-income, low-achieving students who had attended schools in any of 11 poorly
performing school districts. During the 2003-04 school year, enrollment in the voucher program was
capped at 1 percent of the students
in those school districts, rising to
6 percent in 2006-07. The program allowed parents to place their
children in private schools at the
district's expense.
Here the Colorado district
court relied on the local control
provision of the state constitution
to strike down the voucher program altogether. The court emphasized the unusual nature of this
provision and the role of local control in Colorado jurisprudence,
noting chat the Colorado Supreme
Court's 1982 Lujan decision, rejecting a challenge co the state's school
finance system, had relied on che
value of local control. Unlike the
Charter Schools Act upheld in
Booth, which provided for a mix of state and local powers,
the voucher program gave the local school board, in the
court's words,"no substantial discretion over the educational
program embodied in the voucher program;· thus violating
the state constitution.
It remains co be seen how this ruling will fare on appeal.
One could reasonably argue that requiring school districts
co provide some financial support to students attending private school does not directly interfere with the state constitution's mandate chat local school boards have control over
"instruction in the public schools" (emphasis added). But

Only in a
handful of cases
have local
school districts
successfully used
the idea of local
control to resist
state actions.
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however the case is resolved, it
serves as an important reminder of
che importance of state-specific
constitutional language and precedents, the considerable degree of
variation in legal rules in our 50scace federal system, and the continuing power of the local control
idea in education law.

Conclusion

The Colorado
district court
relied on the
local control
provision of the
state constitution
to strike down the
voucher program
altogether.

Several recent developments have
raised new questions about both
che status of local school boards
and the legal significance of the
local control principle. For
instance, court-ordered school
finance reforms-as well as financing reforms undertaken co forestall
litigation-have increased the
state's share of education funding
in many states. Such reforms have
often been accompanied by greater state control over the
distribution of financial resources and the use of state
dollars. Moreover, courts in some states-such as chose in
New Jersey, West Virginia, and Kentucky-have required
those states not only to increase aid to poorer school districts, but also co spell out the content of the education
required by the state's constitution, co better monitor local
school district performance, and co intervene when local
school districts have failed to attain state education goals.
Scates have also become more involved in shaping th e
curriculum and in setting standards for graduation and
teacher certification through the standards and accountability movement. Some have extended the school day or
the school year or even set minimum homework requirements. The federal No Ch ild Left Behind Act accelerates
these trends by exerting a strong degree of federal authority over public education. The act burdens the states as well
as local districts, imposing obligations to develop academic standards, test all students annually in grades 3
through 8, hire"highly qualified" teachers in core subjects,
and reconstitute persistently failing schools in order to
remain eligible for federal aid.
Indeed, ocher changes have involved shifts in power at
the local level or even decentralization below the school
district level, rather than greater control by the state ( or
the fede ral government). As noted, in a number of large
cities, the mayor has effectively displaced che independent
school board. Some states, like Kentucky, have adopted
site-based management programs chat transfer power
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from school districts to individual
school councils. In addition, many
states have provided for charter
schools, which operate with considerable independence from-and
often in conflict with-local school
districts. These developments
reflect the continuing power of che
local control idea even as they
undermine the position of independent school boards. Indeed,
these decentralizing moves may be
as great a challenge to school
boards as centralization. Not only
do they create competing local
school authorities, but they also
open alternative opportunities for
the participation in school governance that the courts have proclaimed to be the normative value
at the core of local autonomy.
Taken together, these recent
developments confirm that public
education is an area of virtually complete state power
(although now subject to greater federal intervention)
that can be reshaped by state legislatures in either a centralizing or decentralizing direction or in both directions
at once. But without changing the theory of state-local relations in education, these developments may be altering the
practice. If so, this could resolve some of the tension
between the for mal law of state control and the de facto
autonomy of local school districts by aligning practice
with the formal legal theory of state power.
Yet it is unlikely chat the political and legal debate over
local control will end any time soon. The call for local control reflects many deep-seated concerns-the pu blic's desire
to participate in and influence decisions on a vital public matter; the role of local tax dollars in financing public education; the impact oflocal schools on local communities; the
interest in taking diverse local preferences and circumstances into account in educational programs; and the possibilities for experimentation and innovation, to name a few.
Even as the state- and federal-led accountability movement presents new challenges to local control, the political,
economic, and educational arguments for local control are
also likely to continue co enjoy support. As a result, the legal
significance of the local control idea, much like the legal status of school boards themselves, is likely co be contested for
some time to come.
-Richard Briffault is vice dean and professor of legislation at the
Columbia University School of Law.
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